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Abstract—Blockchain technology has become almost as famous
for incidents involving security breaches as for its innovative
potential. We shed light on the prevalence and nature of these
incidents through a database structured using the STIX format.
Apart from OPSEC-related incidents, we find that the nature
of many incidents is specific to blockchain technology. Two
categories stand out: smart contracts, and techno-economic
protocol incentives. For smart contracts, we propose to use recent
advances in software testing to find flaws before deployment. For
protocols, we propose the PRESTO framework that allows us to
compare different protocols within a five-dimensional framework.
Index Terms—blockchain, security, smart contracts
I. INTRODUCTION
The idea of the blockchain — an open ledger maintained
and extended by a peer-to-peer network — is shaping up
to become a foundational technology underpinning not just
cryptocurrencies but also a diverse range of other applications
[1]–[4]. However, its novelty means that its surrounding se-
curity infrastructure has some way to go to reach the level
of more established digital services such as online banking.
Combined with the increased valuation of tokens, this has
made cryptocurrency platforms a popular target for attacks.
This is witnessed by several recent high-profile thefts or other
losses of cryptocurrency tokens worth huge sums of money.
These include the collapse of Mt.Gox ($460 million stolen
[5]), the Coincheck hack ($400 million stolen [6]), the DAO
hack ($50 million stolen [7]), and the Parity bug ($160 million
frozen [8]). The first two of these incidents involve ‘traditional’
OPSEC — trust, key, and information management issues
that are no different for a cryptocurrency exchange than for
a bank. However, the latter two incidents are of a different
nature as the flaws themselves are on the blockchain. On one
hand this is good for transparency, because the exact nature of
the bug is publicly visible and the movement of stolen funds
can be tracked. However, because blockchains are append-
only, it is impossible to fix security flaws or recover lost
funds without a hard fork. A similar point can be made for
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unintended consequences of the crypto-economic incentives
that are inherent to blockchain consensus protocols. Examples
include the emergence of mining pools, the potential of 51%
attacks, or block withholding attacks against the entire network
[9] or the incentive structure within pools.1 Since solutions
require profound changes to the protocol, hard forks again
tend to become a necessity.
In this paper, we present an overview of the security
challenges that are unique to blockchain technology, and argue
that these are best confronted through extensive testing before
deployment. The structure of the paper is as follows. In
Section II we present a database of blockchain incidents that
was compiled in a structured manner. From this database, we
learn that while traditional OPSEC-related issues remain the
largest source of incidents, a considerable proportion (roughly
one third) of the incidents are blockchain-specific. These can
further be subdivided into two categories: smart contracts and
protocol incentives. These are discussed in Section III and
Section IV respectively. Section V concludes the paper.
II. BLOCKCHAIN INCIDENT DATABASE
As mentioned in the introduction, the increased market
capitalisation of cryptocurrencies, combined with the lack
of maturity of the surrounding security ecosystem, has led
to a considerable number of security incidents. Blockchain
incidents are defined as attacks resulting in a loss of assets.
These incidents have been reported in different sources and
with different levels of detail.
In this section, we present a first structured attempt to collect
and curate a database of blockchain incidents. The resulting
database supports analytics that we believe will improve the
cybersecurity of blockchain applications. With the blockchain
incident database, the different risks can be identified that
should at least be known to the blockchain community. The
incident database can serve as a reference for blockchain
developers to improve the security of their solutions, and it
will also improve the understanding of known vulnerabilities
1https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/28242v/eligius falls victim
to blocksolution withholding/
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in blockchain deployments. Incident types span from tradi-
tional cyber attacks on cryptocurrency exchanges such as Mt.
Gox [5], to exploits of vulnerable smart contracts [7] and
hacked computers that mine cryptocurrencies [10].
A. Database Creation
Our goal is to create an easy-to-use database containing a
representative set of blockchain incidents. The collection of
the incidents consists of four steps: identification, description,
classification, and review of incidents.
Identification: We assume that all relevant incidents can be
identified in open sources [11]. First, there are specific sources,
such as the “Blockchain Graveyard”2 and the Ethereum Blog
Security Archives. Additionally, Google searches for specific
terms, such as “hacking for Bitcoin mining” and “conducted
51% attacks” provide further data. These sample queries are
inspired by the security challenges identified by ENISA [12].
Given that this is a first attempt to build the database, we
do not claim completeness. However, our ultimate goal is to
develop a representative dataset through crowdsourcing.
Description: For each incident we store a description with
ample references, such as screenshots, and web archives of
original data for further verification. For the incident descrip-
tions, we use STIX [13], which is an international standard
for sharing cybersecurity incident data. We use 14 standard
STIX objects as our fields, extended with a new field —
‘Loss Estimation (crypto)’ — describing the cryptocurrency
involved, such as Bitcoin (BTC), Ether (ETH) or any altcoin
lost in the incident.
The incidents can be viewed and edited using a database
platform, which is running in the cloud and provided as a
web service. Moderated registration on the platform will soon
open.
Incidents are described with as many references as possible
to give a view of the incident that is as broad as possible.
Nevertheless, open sources are limited and we cannot guar-
antee the integrity of the complete picture. We aim to ensure
verifiability of incidents by third parties. However, as most
companies do not fully disclose information, we acknowledge
that some information might be missing. Therefore, each
incident is editable in order to add the latest insights.
Classification: Based on analysis of the first version of the
incident database with 86 incidents, we propose three main
classes of incidents:
OPSEC: Incidents compromising an organisation or in-
dividual’s control of information and access to business-critical
assets.
Smart Contracts: Incidents resulting from improp-
erly written smart contracts deployed and executed on a
blockchain.
Consensus Protocol Incentives: Incidents arising from
malicious exploitation of consensus protocols that create op-
portunities and benefits for blockchain participants.
OPSEC is a container class of blockchain incidents based
on traditional cyber attacks [14]. Smart Contract breaches are
2https://magoo.github.io/Blockchain-Graveyard/
further described in Section III, whereas Consensus Protocol
Incentive vulnerabilities are discussed in Section IV.
Review: The final step in the process of building the
database is the review, which ensures that independent parties
verify incident data. Thus far we have employed students
to provide a somewhat independent view on the incidents.
Ultimately, we hope that we will be able to incentivise the
blockchain community to contribute to the review process.
B. Incident Analytics
Most of the added value of the incident database is provided
by the analytics, such as the time to incident discovery and the
monetary losses incurred. For example, even for our relatively
small collection of incidents covering the period 2011-2018,
we estimate that some US$ 3.55B has been lost.
We propose to build a number of more advanced analytic
capabilities as follows:
• Develop a deep understanding of the attack vectors within
the different classes of incidents.
• Analyse the time from attack to detection, to see how cy-
bersecurity changes as a result of blockchain technology
evolution.
• Investigate the correlation between specific blockchain
technologies and classes of incidents.
• Create a timeline of the losses based on incidents.
• Discover trends in the number of incidents and losses
over time, to see whether countermeasures are effective.
• Map geographical origins of attacks.
Based on our first collection of blockchain incidents we can
draw the following preliminary conclusions.
OPSEC: The majority of incidents in our current
database occurred due to a lack of sufficient OPSEC mea-
sures (about 66%). The key blockchain component is the
opportunity for attackers to confiscate enormous amounts of
cryptocurrencies, resulting in incidents with millions of lost
assets. To prevent the OPSEC class of incidents, standard
cybersecurity solutions are available. For this reason, our
position is to consider OPSEC out-of-scope regarding research
to new solutions.
Smart Contracts: This category makes up about 22% of
our incident database. These incidents occur when a smart con-
tract does not work the way it was intended. The transparency
of blockchains makes it possible to audit all published smart
contracts, which can be supported by tools. For this reason,
our position is to conduct research into new solutions focused
on smart contract testing, as we discuss in Section III.
Consensus Protocol Incentives: Consensus protocol at-
tacks are more difficult to detect than smart contract related
attacks, as the effect is usually the improper mining of a
block or the censorship of nodes. It is hard for miners to
mitigate or even detect attacks. Furthermore, the majority of
the incidents arising from incentives are due to second-order,
unintended effects of blockchain use. These incidents make up
roughly 12% of our database. Our position is to use a formal
framework — see Section IV — to evaluate the incentives of
the consensus protocols in advance, instead of realising the
criminal opportunities after an attack.
III. SMART CONTRACT SECURITY
The concept of smart contracts is a relatively new paradigm
that enables different mutually untrusting parties to encode and
enforce their agreements. Practical implementations of smart
contracts emerged with the advent of blockchain platforms
based on distributed consensus protocols. Currently, main-
stream smart contract platforms, like Ethereum [15], follow
the model of replicated execution. In this model, the code
of all smart contracts, and all calls to contract methods, are
irreversibly appended to a blockchain. Every node participat-
ing in the blockchain protocol reads code and calls from the
blockchain, instantiates the same code, and executes the same
calls, getting the same results and maintaining the same state.
From the security point of view, this model has many
important implications. First of all, the development life cycle
of smart contracts is significantly different from the traditional
software development life cycle, where testing, integration,
and maintenance are repeatable. Since a smart contract’s code
is unchangeable after being appended to a blockchain, devel-
opers have to bind code to a variable if they wish to modify
the behaviour of their contracts later on. In that context, the
development life cycle of smart contracts is much different
from standard software that can be patched and fixed on-the-
fly. One could even argue that as code changes are impossible,
the development of smart contract is not a cycle anymore.
Subsequently, mistakes in code (like logical errors or even
typos) or mistakes in the use of smart contracts (like calling
a method with wrong parameters) are irreversible and costly.
This argument is supported by our analysis of a sample con-
tract as shown in Case Study I. In fact, hackers are constantly
looking for vulnerabilities in deployed smart contracts, treating
them as specific bug-bounty programs [16], where they can get
paid for exploiting vulnerabilities.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to prevent such attacks as de-
ployed code cannot be patched retrospectively. Instead, when
a vulnerability is detected, a new smart contract has to be
deployed to fix it. Although it is difficult for developers, the
immutability of smart contracts is seen by the community
as something positive. Consider, for example, a case where
a developer could fix a bug in an already deployed smart
contract. Such a change could cause collateral damage as
other smart contracts might rely on the fixed functionality
of the changed contract. Furthermore, what the developer of
the smart contract considers a bug could be a property for
developers of relying smart contracts. In that sense, smart
contracts are similar to legislation (just to recall the sentence
“Code is Law” [17]), and therefore should be stable and
carefully prepared before deployment.
Our observations lead us to the conclusion that verification
and testing are especially important in smart contract develop-
ment, and should be an integral part of the analysis and design
steps (and not only follow the implementation step as in the
traditional development life cycle).
A. Testing and Verification
The aim of security testing is to determine whether a
program has a vulnerability that can be exploited by an
attacker [18]. Smart contracts are programs and may therefore
contain vulnerabilities [19]. Smart contracts are usually short
but they are also concurrent [20] and permanent, so probably
more difficult to get right than ordinary programs [21].
There is a relatively recent review of smart contract vulner-
abilities [22], which shows that smart contracts have classical
issues (like off-by-one errors) as well as specific issues (like
running out of gas). Smart contracts should therefore be
subjected to security analysis and testing.
There are several types of testing and analysis tools that can
be used on smart contracts, such as running hand crafted tests
on a fast test network with the truffle framework3, fuzzing
of the input of the contract, mutating of the code of the
contract [23], static analysis of properties of the contract [24],
model checking of behaviours of a model of the contract [25],
and theorem proving of properties of the program [26]. There
are also runtime verification techniques, such as proof carrying
code [27].
Some tools require test engineers to be highly skilled. For
example the use of theorem provers requires considerable skill,
whereas automatic static analysis tools4 are simple to use.
Ease of use does not necessarily mean that the results are
uninteresting; this depends on the sophistication of the tool.
We believe that there is enough low-hanging fruit for us to
be able to afford focussing on tools that are easy to use, such
as mutation and fuzzing tools. We are unaware of existing
literature on the application of fuzzing and mutating to smart
contracts. These techniques can form the basis of a powerful
test suite — i.e., one that has good code coverage and helps
the test engineer to distinguish successful traces from failures.
Writing tests is both tedious and error prone. Fuzzing varies
the inputs to a program under test, which helps to extend the
test suite. Mutating varies the code of a program under test,
which helps to increase the test coverage. However, even with
these tools significant creativity is needed on the part of the test
engineer to develop a comprehensive test suite for a program
or smart contract.
We list four approaches that we believe can help the
test engineer. These are all low-risk high-return approaches,
building on a wealth of related work. Most approaches regard
a contract from a different point of view, which gives the
test engineer insights that he/she might not otherwise have
acquired. For example, if a lottery contract has never paid
out, a security problem is likely.
1) Documentation for developers and testers: The first ap-
proach is to improve the documentation on smart contract de-
velopment and testing. It is difficult to develop smart contracts
because the documentation is scant and poorly organised.
The Ethereum yellow paper [28] can be hard to read, the
official documentation of the Solidity language is primarily
3See http://truffleframework.com
4See for example https://securify.ch
Case Study I: Vitaluck is a poorly tested DApp
Vitaluck was a DApp launched on 26 Jan 2018 by a
developer known on reddit as luckyico. This DApp caught
our attention because of the name.a Vitaluck is a raffle
game with the following advertised rules:b
• Each play generates a random number between
0 and 1000. If the player’s number is bigger than
the previous number you win the Jackpot.
• For every bet, the commission is 10%.
• For every losing bet, 10% is paid to the previous
winning address, and 80% goes in the Jackpot.
• The minimum bet is 0.05 ETH.
• When the winning number exceeds 900, it is reset
to 1.
We conducted an audit of the source of the contract, and its
history on the blockchain.c We wrote one script to analyse
the transactions of the contract. We also hand-translated
the contract into an equivalent JavaScript program so that
we could simulate the game for arbitrary numbers of
rounds and players. The game has been played 27 times
by 10 accounts, at least one of which is owned by the
author of the game.
We discovered six typical smart contract security issues:
• The contract uses the time stamp of the last block
on the blockchain as a source of low-entropy ran-
domness. This means that the ticket numbers can be
predicted, which makes it easy to cheat.
• The reset method subtracts 0.05 ETH from the jack-
pot without checking whether there is enough ETH
in the jackpot.
• The jackpot can never be completely emptied, so the
residual funds cannot be claimed.
• The list of previous bets is stored but never pruned,
so the list grows indefinitely.
• The rules suggest that the commission is 10%, but
the commission is actually higher. The commission
slowly decreases, but after many thousands of rounds
it is still higher than 10%.
• There is no exception handling in the contract,
whereas it uses methods like transfer that can throw
exceptions.
By way of responsible disclosure, we tried to contact the
author of the Vitaluck contract in a variety of ways to
discuss our findings but he/she has not replied. Since the
DApp has been disabled, we believe that publication of
this case study is justified, as it will serve as a warning to
the community not to skip testing too lightly.
According to the post on coinsnews cited above, Vitaluck
was the first DApp built by the author. This would go
someway towards explaining why there are so many issues
in a relatively short and straightforward contract. On the
other hand, if we could find six issues in about a day’s
work, the author should have been able to find them also.
We believe that the contract simply has not been tested
well, which underlines the position taken in this paper.
aSee https://coinsnews.com/very-excited-to-share-my-first-solidity-project-vitaluck
bSee https://www.vitaluck.com/my-bets/
cSee https://etherscan.io/address/0xef7c7254c290df3d167182356255cdfd8d3b400b
a collection of examples [29], there are many resources that
tell parts of the story and invariably the developer ends up
searching the web5 for questions that might be related to the
issues, hoping to find usable answers.
Consider as an example how to determine whether a trans-
action has run out of gas. The Byzantium version of Ethereum
returns a status flag in the transaction receipt to indicate this.
Other versions require the programmer to compare the actual
amount of gas used to the maximum amount of gas passed to
the transaction. If the two are equal, the probability is high that
indeed the transaction has run out of gas. The probably is not
100%, since it is theoretically possible that the transaction used
exactly the maximum amount of gas. If the developer knows
what he/she is looking for, the information can be found. But
many unsuspecting developers will probably make mistakes
because they cannot find the information they are looking for.
We believe that a handbook for smart contract developers
and testers is long overdue.
5See for example https://stackoverflow.com
2) Fuzz the inputs to smart contracts: The second approach
is to fuzz the inputs of the smart contracts. Fuzzing has
been proved as an effective and fast technique for finding
security vulnerabilities [30], [31]. It can be applied directly
to a smart contract by applying invalid and unexpected inputs
and observing behaviour of the smart contract. Fuzzing can
also be used for finding bugs specific to smart contracts. For
example, by varying the limit on the available amount of
gas, transactions can be aborted at arbitrary points, possibly
leaving the contract in an insecure state. Another example is
to randomise the order of calls, as in some cases a miner or
underlying network can influence this, and observe the impact.
3) Mutate the code of smart contracts: The third approach
is to develop a mutation tool for smart contracts. This has
been proposed before,6 but the attempt has been abandoned.
The challenge is for the mutation generator to understand
enough of the semantics of the smart contract language to
generate only useful mutants. One possible route is to export
6See https://github.com/ethereum/solidity/issues/1172
Case Study II: Solidity compiler bugs introduce vulnera-
bilities in high-value contracts
We analysed the top 1,000 contracts by balance of the
almost 20,000 verified smart contracts on etherscan.io. A
contract is verified if its source code and compiler version
are made public.d Making this information public improves
transparency and should therefore increase the confidence
in the contract.
n version release date
120 v0.1-3.* 2015
88 v0.4.0-9 2016
14 v0.4.10 Mar 2017
68 v0.4.11 May 2017
41 v0.4.12-14 Jul 2017
122 v0.4.15-16 Aug 2017
36 v0.4.17 Sep 2017
187 v0.4.18 Oct 2017
207 v0.4.19 Nov 2017
78 v0.4.20 Feb 2018
39 v0.4.21 Mar 2018
1000 total
The contract with
the largest balance
holds 1,500,000
ETH, the smallest
balance is just 0.9
ETH. The sum total
of the balance of
the 1,000 contracts
is just over 5 mil-
lion ETH, or about
5% of the total
amount of ETH
tokens in circula-
tion. Therefore we
believe our selection of contracts to be representative for
contracts on Ethereum.
Some of the 1,000 verified contracts were compiled by
a version of the Solidity compiler that is more than a
year old. Older versions have known bugs that introduce
vulnerabilities in the compiled code. The table to the left
lists how many contracts (n) have been compiled with the
various compiler versions.
Of the 1,000 verified high-value contracts, almost half has
a vulnerability caused by a known bug in the Solidity
compiler. The following table lists how many contracts
have a low/medium/high severity issue:
#contracts severity level
128 high
192 medium
10 low
158 very low
488 total
About one third of the
verified high-value con-
tracts has a medium
to high severity vul-
nerability. Since a con-
tract is baked into the
blockchain, it cannot
simply be recompiled
with an up-to-date ver-
sion of the compiler to remove the vulnerabilities. This is
clearly an issue of smart contracts that should be resolved.
Again this case study supports our position that more
testing is needed.
dSee https://etherscan.io
the abstract syntax tree from the smart contract compiler,
mutate it, and import the mutant again in the compiler.
4) Search the blockchain for tests: The fourth approach
to address the problem of insufficient tests is to search the
blockchain for traces of already deployed smart contracts.
The blockchain contains all code and data needed to recreate
the state of the world at each time a block was mined.
Therefore, the traces from the blockchain contain enough
information to generate tests. This idea is similar to using
the counter examples produced by model checkers for testing
purposes [32]. The difference is that we do not have to create
a model of the contract; instead the trace originates from the
contract itself. Both testnet and livenet deployments of smart
contracts can be searched for traces. These deployments are
probably not fully tested; hence the test engineer will have
to inspect the generated tests carefully. We believe that such
generated tests could complement a test suite written by hand.
Most of the techniques that we describe in this chapter exist
already. However, the Dapps that we have analysed show that
not all developers master the relevant techniques. So there is
a need to make these more accessible, starting by improved
documention.
B. Secure Smart Contracts Distribution
Since smart contract platforms have associated cryptocur-
rencies, they are attractive medium for fraud, often imple-
mented as smart contracts. In traditional software distribu-
tion there are many models to handle such problems. For
instance, open-source projects are driven by communities who
have interest in fixing bugs and increasing the quality of
these projects. Similarly, centralised software repositories (like
Apple App Store, Google Play, or Ubuntu repositories) are
controlled by companies who have incentives in removing
malicious code, as it directly affects their clients.
By contrast, the distribution of smart contracts does not
follow any of these models. Smart contracts are submitted by
developers (anyone can act as a developer) and are appended
to a blockchain by miners (i.e., nodes that participate in
the underlying consensus protocol). The irreversibility and
censorship-resistance of smart contract platforms do not al-
low anyone to remove an added smart contract (even if it
evident that it is malicious), so providing security in such an
architecture is a challenging task.
In order to improve on this, we propose a proactive smart
contract publishing architecture. The main observation is that
miners of smart contract platforms have conflicting incentives:
• they have incentive to add every smart contract submitted
(even malicious), as appending code to the blockchain
rewards them, and
• they have incentive to keep the ecosystem secure, as
otherwise it might lose popularity affecting their rewards.
A high-level idea of our architecture is to keep adding all
submitted smart contracts to the blockchain, and to keep test-
ing their security properties. Then for every found (potential)
vulnerability a warning can be signalled in the blockchain,
such that everyone can see it. In particular we distinguish two
deployment models of such an architecture.
In the first model, a miner before adding a smart contract
tests it with various testing methodologies and tools (see
Section III-A). The miner publishes the smart contract along
with the obtained testing results. For instance, these results can
indicate that the smart contract has a potential backdoor or a
kill switch, or it has some features of a Ponzi scheme [33].
When appended to the blockchain these results are immutable
and visible to everyone, thus can act as reliable warnings.
An alternative deployment model, is to introduce a dedicated
service which would constantly test existing and incoming
smart contracts, and would publish testing outcomes (i.e.,
warning) at a pre-defined location. An advantage of this
approach, is that such a service can be upgraded to include new
test methods and vectors, and does not depend on miners who
might be be unwilling to conduct additional work [34]. We
leave details of this architecture as a future work, however, we
envision that such a service can be maintained by community
contributors and its security can be enhanced by means like a
trusted execution environment.
IV. CRYPTOECONOMIC PROTOCOLS & THE PRESTO
FRAMEWORK
At the core of blockchain platforms such as Bitcoin and
Ethereum lies the emergence of new protocols which aim
to align the interests of several self-interested parties that do
not necessarily trust each other. Different platforms combine
different ideas and explore different trade-offs. These ideas can
be better understood as points in a high-dimensional space, and
the goal of a protocol designer is to develop protocols that lie
on the Pareto frontier of the design space, i.e., systems whose
desirable properties cannot all be simultaneously improved.
An important tool towards understanding the design space
better is the organisation of “desirable” properties onto differ-
ent axes. This organisation allows to perform a type of divide-
and-conquer approach where we can at a first step explore
the fundamental limitations of what is achievable within each
category (or different combinations of these categories) as
well as to explore connections with other well established
disciplines in computer science and mathematics in general.
Here we briefly present the basics of the PRESTO frame-
work [35], which is an acronym for Persistence, Robustness,
Efficiency, STability, and Optimality (see Fig. 1). We discuss
each of these below, in reverse order:
Optimality: Optimality concerns the question of whether
the protocol maximises the quality of certain outcomes. Ideally
the protocol should be mathematically proven to provide these
guarantees.
Optimality is one of the most basic properties that a protocol
can satisfy. It can be ascertained using mathematical analysis
techniques that range from the very basic (e.g., calculus) to
the more advanced (e.g., optimisation theory) [36], [37]. In
STability
Optimality
Efficiency
Robustness
Persistence
Fig. 1. Graphical representation of the PRESTO framework.
the context of blockchain protocols, examples of optimality
include formal proofs of liveness and safety under “standard”
network/agent conditions — see, e.g., [38] for an overview of
these properties for several recently implemented consensus
protocols that are based on Byzantine fault tolerance.
Stability: Stability means that it is in the participants’ best
interest to follow the rules of the protocol. In concrete terms,
this means that the protocol is a Nash equilibrium (or more
generally an incentive compatible outcome, e.g. a dominant
strategy). An equilibrium is an outcome that is optimal from
the perspective of all decision makers involved.
This has been reasonably thoroughly studied (since 1940s,
Nash [39], von Neumann [40]). Game theory and economics
provides numerous tools to model and analyze such settings.
Importantly, stability does not imply optimality. The “price
of anarchy” literature studies exactly this tension between
equilibration and efficiency of outcomes [41] and shows how
in many natural settings equilibria although not perfectly
optimal can be approximately optimal. Mechanism design on
the other hand aims to re-design the rules of games so that
individual incentives are perfectly aligned with societal goals.
For blockchain protocols, stability means that it is best for
agents in the default setting to follow the reference protocol.
Efficiency: Does the protocol make efficient use of its
computational resources? Does it perform its core tasks as
fast as possible, using as little space as possible, using as little
randomness as possible, using as little energy as possible, and
using parallelisation efficiently?
Efficiency of computation, at least from the perspective
of time and space, has been reasonably thoroughly studied
(since 1940s, Turing, von Neumann). Computational complex-
ity theory provides the most carefully designed framework for
studying the fundamental limitations of efficient computation
[42]. These limitations force us to consider trade-offs, e.g.,
approximate optimality versus speed (e.g., approximation al-
gorithms [43]). Ideally, a protocol implements a (near) optimal
equilibrium efficiently. Algorithmic game theory and mecha-
nism design study questions on the intersection of optimality,
efficiency and stability [44]. For a blockchain example, the
use of computational resources by the Bitcoin protocol is not
efficient: the maximum transaction throughput is the same as
five years ago despite a dramatic increase in hash rate and
energy consumption [45].
Robustness: Suppose that the protocol is reasonably close
to an optimal efficient equilibrium on paper. Real distributed
systems pose more challenges (e.g. asynchrony, communica-
tion delays, users might have different utility functions due
to differences in electricity/computation costs/risk attitudes,
collusion, etc.).
This is an emerging subfield within algorithmic game the-
ory. A particular question of interest is what happens in the
case of coalition formation or collusion. E.g., in [9] it is shown
that if x > 13 fraction of the total mining power is owned
by a mining pool, then the following the Bitcoin protocol is
not an equilibrium. Specifically, the paper describes a strategy
that can be used by a minority pool to obtain more revenue
than the pool’s fair share, i.e., more than its ratio of the
total mining power. In [46], [47] more elaborate attacking
strategies are explored, as well as nearly-tight thresholds on the
computational power of the attacker under which the honest
strategy remains a Nash equilibrium.
Persistence: Finally, what if the protocol is subjected to a
severe attack or black-swan event, can the system recover?
How fast, and at what cost? For persistence, we take this
idea to its logical extreme. We assume that the system may
be always under attack, and design it so that it recovers and
provides the desirable properties often.
Formally, we define a strongly persistent property to be
eventually be satisfied (and stay satisfied) given any initial
system condition. By contrast, a weakly persistent property
will eventually be satisfied given any initial system condition
and will become satisfied again infinitely often [48]. Such
ideas have been introduced within evolutionary game theory
[49] as well as the study of biological systems (i.e. recovery
of a ecosystem after infection from a virus) [50], however, the
combination of these ideas with tools from optimisation theory
and algorithm design have not been really explored. [48], [51]
perform some exploratory steps in this direction.
A desirable property is not satisfied by a system just
in equilibrium, but it is satisfied in a dynamic way. This
allows for more flexibility to explore trade-offs between re-
covery/convergence time, ‘periodicity’, and the cost of imple-
mentation. Note that two (or more) incompatible properties
can both be supported in a weakly persistent manner.
Summing up, the PRESTO framework sees protocols as
a nesting doll with the following cascade of goals. First,
optimality requires that the protocol solves the problem that
it is defined to address, otherwise there is no good reason
to deploy it and the designer should go back to the drawing
board. Second, efficiency requires that resources are used as
efficiently as possible (e.g. time, space, network bandwidth,
energy, randomness, etc.). Next, stability analysis aims to
make sure that self-interested agents have an incentive to
follow and implement the protocol, i.e., that the protocol itself
is an equilibrium. If not the agents will deviate from it and
the deployed protocol will behave unpredictably in practice.
Given an optimal, stable and efficient protocol we can then
start considering more complicated behavioral models from
the perspective of the agents. How robust is the equilibrium
and its properties if we “perturb” the underlying assumptions,
e.g., what if agents are risk-averse, or can form coalitions,
how do the equilibria of these more realistic models compare
to those idealised equilibria in the more vanilla settings?
Finally, persistence goes beyond equilibrium thinking and asks
which properties can be guaranteed not at equilibrium (i.e.,
consistently and at every single point in time), but maybe only
recurrently (e.g., at consistent intervals, like once a week).
This flexibility might allow us to provide guarantees that
are impossible to satisfy in equilibrium. For example, two
mutually exclusive properties cannot be both implemented at
equilibrium, but can be guaranteed in a persistent manner by
a system that cycles through different states.
Exploring these trade-offs is a fascinating area for mul-
tidisciplinary research that could help us improve upon the
understanding and design of the current protocols, as well help
incorporate ideas from other well-established fields (e.g., al-
gorithmic game theory, evolutionary game theory, complexity
theory, approximation algorithms, a.o.).
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In this paper, we have presented an overview of the security
challenges in blockchain technology, and proposed ways to go
forward. Our first step was to create the, to our knowledge,
first structured attempt at cataloguing the wide range of
blockchain-related security incidents. We find that apart from
traditional OPSEC, many incidents are of a nature that is
specific to blockchain technology. Two categories stand out:
smart contracts, and techno-economic protocol incentives. In
both settings, we argue that it is vital to properly test before
deployment, because faults cannot be corrected without a
hard fork. For the smart contracts, we have presented four
testing approaches, building on the latest developments in
automated code testing such as fuzzing, mutating, and model
checking. For the protocol-level incentives, we have proposed
a framework for comparing the security properties of protocols
by ranking them across five dimensions. It is our position that
for blockchain security to become mature, a rethink that leads
to comprehensive testing before deployment is a necessity.
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